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The legal system in the United States provides little protection for
workers against the job and benefit loss which accompanies plant
closings. Within the existing legal framework in the United States,
many plants can close without giving workers any advance notice.
And, in conjunction with a plant closing, many workers lose their
pensions and health and life insurance completely.
In short, the United States has failed to deal adequately with the
problem of plant closings. This failure is well reflected by the fact
that no comprehensive and accurate statistics on the subject exist.
The Job Training Partnership Act of 1982' contained a provision
mandating a nationwide study of plant closings. Yet, we still do not
have any statistics; the earliest they possibly may be available is 1986.
Even that may be doubtful because funding for continuing the study
either may be severely reduced or eliminated altogether. The Bureau
of Labor Statitics figures 2 which Dean Beaird mentioned were complied as part of the groundwork for the study. Those figures were
released in 1984, and show that 11.5 million United States workers
over the age of twenty were laid off work because of plant closings,
slack work, or elimination of their job classification between 1979
and 1984. Approximately 5.1 million of those had held their job for
three years or longer. Further analysis was done only for this group.
While sixty percent of these 5.1 million laid off workers were reemployed as of January 1984, forty-five percent of the reemployed held
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lower paying jobs. Older workers, women, blacks, and Hispanics
were less successful in finding new employment; of these, older workers had the most difficult time being reemployed. Of the entire 11.5
milion Americans who lost their jobs during this period, according
to this study almost one-half received no advance notice of their
layoff.
The only real protection that a worker in the United States has
against plant closings is available to workers who are represented by
a labor union. Although the statistics are not very accurate, represented employees compose only between eighteen and twenty percent
of the private national workforce - relatively few workers. The
protections which these represented workers have are the bargaining
requirements of the National Labor Relations Act discussed by Dean
Beaird and the specific or implied provisions of their collective bargaining agreements, a subject to which I will return.
The remainder of the private workforce is, by and large, unprotected. No national legislation has been enacted and very few states
have statutes covering plant closings. I have a few copies of House
Rule 1616,1 the proposed federal legislation. The bill is actually very
conservative. Although several other bills have been proposed at the
national level since 1973, H.R. 1616 is the first that has ever made
it out of even the subcommittee; all the other bills died at that
level. Those previous proposals would have amended the National
Labor Relations Act to make plant closings a mandatory subject of
bargaining. That apparently was much too radical for most people
in the United States; H.R. 1616 is much more conservative. As Dean
Beaird mentioned, this bill merely provides for a ninety-day notice
of a closing of permanent layoff affecting more than fifty employees
and consultation with the union in the plant if there is one. If there
is no union in the plant, the bill simply "encourages" the employer
to speak with the employees. The bill allows an employer to circumvent the notification provision completely if it can show "unavoidable
business circumstances;'" 4 it has yet to be seen just what this term
means. The bill itself calls for formation of a commission to study
and make recommendations about further legislation in the plant
closing area. Now, as Dean Beaird mentioned, Labor Secretary Brock
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just recently announced that he will form a task force on the subject.'
Already, opponents of the national legislation are saying that if we
6
have a task force, we do not need legislation.
The state legislation which exists is piecemeal and basically very
weak. And, as Dean Beaird mentioned, all of it is under vigorous
attack from business groups who claim that no state legislation validly
can exist on the subject of plant closings because of the doctrine of
federal preemption. Maine has a statute which requires companies
to notify their employees and the municipality if they move a plant
more than 100 miles away from its location. 7 This Act also requires
employers to provide severance pay to workers who lose their jobs
because of such a move; however, the fine for failure to provide
severance pay is only $500.00. Needless to say, the sanction is insufficient to make the severance pay requirement enforceable.
Wisconsin also has a plant closing statute, which was first enacted
in 1976; it requires sixty-days' notice of a closing be given to the
state. Last year, the statute was amended to require companies with
100 or more workers to notify employees, unions, and municipalities
affected by the closing, as well as the state. 8 The first test of Wisconsin
law may well come this summer. The attorney general of the state
is pursuing an action against Jones Dairy Farm, a company that did
not give the required sixty-days' notice.
The Illinois legislature has considered plant closing bills three times,
but none has been enacted into law there. Yet another bill may be
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presented this year. The legislation being discussed would require six
months' notice of a closing, a six-month extension of health care
benefits, and severance pay to employees with more than three years
of service. However, supporters are not optimistic that this new
proposal will pass if it is introduced. Minnesota also has attempted
unsuccessfully to enact plant closing legislation. Still another attempt
may be made this year; but, as in Wisconsin, the labor people in
Minnesota are not really hopeful of passage. Bills requiring prior
notification of plant closings have been discussed in New Jersey, but
have failed to be enacted, although, as Dean Beaird pointed out, a
bill passed recently in New Jersey is awaiting the Govenor's decision
on whether to sign it. 9 This bill is rather strict compared to those
of other states; it requires six-months' notice of a plant closing to
the state and three-months' notice to any union representing employees
at the plant to be closed. In addition, it requires an employer to
provide severance pay and to continue health and life insurance for
six months.
By comparison, Massachusetts has a voluntary notice ordinance in
effect.10 It provides certain incentives to businesses that give advance
notice of a plant closing. Pennsylvania is discussing similar voluntary
programs offering tax incentives to businesses that give prior notice.
Pennsylvania has a very severe problem with plant closings. Between
1980 and 1984, over 100,000 persons in the state lost their jobs
because of the closing of industrial plants." A notice ordinance is
in effect in Philadelphia 2 and in Vacaville, California. In Pittsburg,
Pennsylvania, the city council passed a plant closing ordinance in
1983. Several business groups sued, claiming that the law was invalid
because it violated the state's Home Rule Charter Act which prohibits
a locality from regulating business. The trial court in Pennsylvania
agreed with the business groups, 3 and the Pennsylvania appellate
courts refused to hear the case.
A major problem with state legislation is that individual states are
very wary of scaring away business. Moreover, those states that need
plant closing legislation the most are the same states that are most
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vulnerable to these fears. In addition, this legislation is very piecemeal
and generally quite conservative. The voluntary plans are fairly offensive to some in the labor movement because basically what they
do is offer a reward to business for doing something (such as giving
notice or offering severance pay) which some think should be required
of all businesses, given the tax breaks and other benefits the companies
receive.
Lawsuits have been filed in conjunction with plant closings under
the Age Discrimination Act' 4 and under ERISA, 5 which is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act.' 6 ERISA basically regulates
and insures certain pension funds that employees and employers have
established. Apparently in some cases, companies have been keeping
computer tabs on their plants; wheh a workforce in a particular plant
is approaching the age where their pensions will become vested, the
companies are closing down those plants. 7 The argument put forward
is that this action violates the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act because the Act specifically provides that an employer cannot
discriminate against employees on the basis of their eligibility for
pensions. The theory is much the same under the Age Discrimination
Act. In cases advancing age discrimination arguments, the plants
being closed are ones where the workforce is composed primarily of
older workers; the allegation is that the employer is seeking to avoid
retirement costs.
With regard to collective bargaining agreements, I have sufficient
copies of portions of a study done by the Industrial Union Department
of AFL-CIO.' 8 It surveys 100 major collective bargaining agreements
in the United States and provides statistics from 1984 on contract
provisions dealing with plant closings. Thirty percent of the collective
bargaining agreements in the study provided for severance pay in the
event of closing. This provision was the most common included in
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the contracts. Only 2.6707o of the contracts provided for a special
company/union committee to discuss plant closings. When you review
the statistics, you will see that what unions have been able to bargain
for is very limited. And further, recent decisions by the Reagan Board
make it appear that unions' bargaining power will become much more
limited. In the Otis Elevator case discussed by Dean Beaird, the board
remanded the question of "effects bargaining" to the administrative
law judge, who is the trial judge in Board proceedings. While the
issue before him will be a factual one - namely, did the company,
in fact, bargain over the effects of the closing - chances are that
if the employer loses, it will certainly appeal the decision to the
Board. The Board could undermine or even reserve the requirement
that a company participate in "effects bargaining." The company's
counsel in Otis Elevator implied that at some point, (not necessarily
in the Otis case) employers may challenge "effects bargaining."19
Another source of protection for employees in plant closing situations is the collective bargaining agreement. Clear language on job
security which prevents layoffs or relocations or work transfers or
subcontracting can be most helpful. 20 Strong clear language like this
is hard to win, particularly since unions' bargaining power has been
severely eroded over the years. With language that states that the
company will not reassign any work presently performed by employees
covered by the agreement to personnel in any other plant, employees
can often prevail before an arbitrator and win an award preventing
work transfer. In those situations it is essential to go into court and
get an injunction pending the outcome of the arbitration hearing. If
that is not done, even though the arbitrator may rule in the employee's
favor, the arbitrator will be very reluctant to order that the plant be
reopened. A problem with bargaining for specific language preventing
plant closings is that if any compromises on the language must be
made or any part of it be withdrawn, an arbitrator will use that
bargaining history to limit severely the union's rights. You either
have to have the bargaining strength to get very good language into
the contract or not bargain on specific language, and leave the contract
silent. In that cae, it is possible to argue an implied rights theory,
saying that the recognition clause gives the union an implied right
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to continue having the employees it represents do the work. Unions
have had very limited success with an argument in the plant closing
situation, however, it is at least a posibility. Nevertheless, apparently
weak language can often be much more harmful than no language
at all when presented to an arbitrator.
One other theory that unions have been utilizing comes into play
when a company has demanded concessions and the union has had
to give back benefits and/or accept wage cuts. In these cases, when
the company goes ahead and closes the plant anyway, unions have
been presenting cases partially on a promissory estoppel theory, arguing that the union's concessions were in exchange for the company's
promise to stay in business. There has been very limited success with
this approach. Success basically depends on the actual agreement and
the words that the company used at the time. One case, decided on
ordinary contract theory, involved a company which actually put in
writing that if the union gave concessions the company would spend
$2.5 million reinvesting in the plant. 2' Then the company failed to
make that investment although the union did give the concessions.
While the company was not required to maintain this plant, the judge
ordered that the company either pay the union the $2.5 million dollars
or pay the equivalent of the concessions. But, unless the company's
commitment is in writing and is fairly clear, that theory has not
enjoyed great success.
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